

Message Text

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TO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MCAP, NATO

SUBJECT: BASIC ISSUES OF DEFENSE PLANNING: ANTI-ARMOR
DEFENSES

REF: (A) USNATO 4597; (B) USNATO 4944; (C) USNATO 5100

1. THIS MESSAGE CONSTITUTES BASIC US CONTRIBUTION TO
EWG REPORT ON ANTI-ARMOR DEFENSES. AT THE JUNE DPC,
SECRETARY SCHLESINGER CALLED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF
PERCEIVED BALANCES WITH POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES. WE
HAVE NOTED ROUGH BALANCES IN MOST RESPECTS BETWEEN
NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, WITH THE MOST GLARING
ASYMMETRY PERSISTING BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES BEING THAT
OF ARMOR CAPABILITY. NATO CAN MAKE UP A SIGNIFICANT

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PART OF THIS DEFICIENCY IN A PERCEIVABLE, NUMERICAL
WAY ONLY BY PROVIDING SUFFICIENT NUMBERS OF ANTI-ARMOR
WEAPONS. THIS OBJECTIVE CAN BE ACHIEVED PRIMARILY

THROUGH PROVIDING AN ADEQUATE NUMBER OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS TO INFANTRY UNITS. WE DO NOT SEE PROSPECT OF CLOSING GAP IN TANKS ALONE. EXISTING PROGRAMS FOR TANKS, HELIBORNE ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, BARRIERS, AND AIR-DELIVERED WEAPONS SHOULD BE CONTINUED.

2. A. WE RECOGNIZE THAT VIGOROUS TANK REPLACEMENT PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE IN NATO. INCREASED

TANK TOE'S IN CENTRAL REGION HAVE RESULTED IN ADDITION OF OVER 1,000 TANKS IN PLACE SINCE 1968 INCLUDING TWO ADDITIONAL US TANK BATTALIONS WHICH WERE RECENTLY SENT TO EUROPE. TANKS IN GREECE AND TURKEY ARE PROGRAMMED TO DOUBLE FROM 1970 TO 1975. WE COMMEND USE OF OLDER TANKS FOR RESERVES AND SPECIALIZED UNITS AS FOR EXAMPLE IN FRG AND NETHERLANDS. FYI: WE RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A PROPER BALANCE OF TANK AND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS IN THE FORCES. HOWEVER, UNTIL WE HAVE BETTER KNOWLEDGE OF TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE FACTORS AS THEY AFFECT EACH COUNTRY, WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO PROPOSE FURTHER TOE EXPANSION BEYOND THAT PRESENTLY PROGRAMMED. END FYI.

B. THE US HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN A VIGOROUS PROGRAM FOR INFANTRY ANTI-TANK SYSTEMS. NEAR-TERM IMPROVEMENTS IN US ANTI-TANK CAPABILITIES ARE NOW FULLY PROGRAMMED. THIS PROGRAM INVOLVES REPLACEMENT OF CREW-SERVED ANTI-TANK WEAPONS IN INFANTRY UNITS ON MORE THAN A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS WITH MODERN ANTI-TANK WEAPONS. THE GREATER THAN ONE-FOR-ONE REPLACEMENT PERMITS A LARGER FRACTION OF THE AVAILABLE TANK FLEET TO BE USED AS THE STRIKE FORCE IN THE MOBILE DEFENSE. US ARMY, FOR EXAMPLE, WILL REPLACE THREE ENTAC, SIX 106 MM RR, AND 18 90 MM RR PER INFANTRY BATTALION WITH 18 TOW AND 27 DRAGON. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE 558 M551, MORE THAN 8,500 MAVERICK, 17,000 ROCKEYE, 85,000 LAW, AND 165 TOW/COBRA HELICOPTERS PROGRAMMED FOR US FORCES IN EUROPE, WITH 380 M551, OVER 100 TOW/COBRA, AND

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ADDITIONAL MUNITIONS IN THE REINFORCING FORCES.

C. INFORMATION ON ALLIED PROGRAMS IS QUITE FRAGMENTARY. BITS AND PIECES APPEAR IN DPQS, BUT NO OVERALL PROGRAMS. THERE IS A PERSISTENT CONFUSION IN REPORTING BETWEEN LAUNCHERS AND MISSILES.

3. THE MIDDLE EAST WAR TENTATIVELY CONFIRMS VALUE OF ANTITANK WEAPONS. US AND RVN FORCES HAD GREAT SUCCESS AGAINST NVN TANKS, WITH WEAPONS AS DIVERSE AS M-48 MEDIUM TANK, LAW AND TOW. UH-1 MOUNTED TOW HIT ON

26 OF 27 FIRINGS IN VN- FIELD SIMULATIONS OF TOW/M-113 VS TANKS SHOW ABOUT A 3 TO 1 EXCHANGE RATIO IN FAVOR OF TOW (CONFIRMED BY GERMAN STUDIES PRESENTED TO NATO DEFENSE PLANNING WORKSHOP). TOW-EQUIPPED HELICOPTERS AGAINST LEOPARD AND VULCAN IN SIMULATIONS IN GERMANY HAD A FAVORABLE EXCHANGE RATIO OF 18 TO 1. WE NOTE RECENT AC/243 PANEL 111 REPORT THAT CONCLUDED THAT NATO COULD OFFSET THE ADVANTAGE OF WARSAW PACT

IN NUMBERS OF TANKS BY INCREASING DENSITY OF HEAVY ANTITANK WEAPONS (HAW) AND MEDIUM ANTITANK WEAPONS (MAW) AND BY TAKING OTHER MEASURES OF RELATIVELY LOW COST.

4. NATO COUNTRIES SHOULD AS A MATTER OF FIRST PRIORITY, ENSURE LARGE, DEFINITE PROGRAMS FOR INFANTRY HEAVY AND MEDIUM ANTITANK WEAPONS, AND GIVE ADEQUATE VISIBILITY TO THOSE PROGRAMS IN NATO REPORTS. A TWO-PHASE PROGRAM IS LAID OUT BELOW. DISCUSSION AND FIGURES BELOW APPLY TO CENTER REGION, FOR WHICH WE HAVE DATA. WE DO NOT HAVE ADEQUATE DATA FOR OTHER REGIONS, BUT RECOMMENDATIONS PROBABLY WILL APPLY THERE AS WELL.

5. IN THE FIRST PHASE, ALL OLDER, LESS-CAPABLE WEAPONS SHOULD BE REPLACED ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS BY NEWER, MORE CAPABLE WEAPONS. ILLUSTRATIVE NUMBERS ARE APPENDED TO THIS MESSAGE, BUT FIRST PHASE WOULD INVOLVE:

- A. RETENTION OF EXISTING FULLY-CAPABLE WEAPONS
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(E.G., TOW, JPZ KANONE,M551);

- B. REPLACEMENT OF OBSOLESCEMENT HEAVY INFANTRY WEAPONS (E.G., SS-11, 106 RR) WITH A MODERN HAW ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS.

- C. REPLACEMENT OF OBSOLESCEMENT MEDIUM WEAPONS (E.G., KARL GUSTAV, 90 MM RR) WITH A MODERN MAW ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS.

THESE STEPS WOULD RESULT IN MORE THAN 14,000 CAPABLE WEAPONS IN PLACE IN THE CENTER REGION.

6. IN THE SECOND PHASE, THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS IN MANEUVER AND RECONNAISSANCE UNITS WOULD BE INCREASED, SIMILAR TO THE US PROGRAM OF 18 HAW AND 27 MAW PER MECHANIZED AND INFANTRY BATTALION, 12 HAW AND 24 MAW PER AIRBORNE BATTALION, AND 27 ANTITANK GUNS OR HAW PER RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION. THESE PARTICULAR

NUMBERS REFLECT TAILORING TO THE PROJECTED STRUCTURE OF US FORCES AND TO THE THREAT FORECAST FOR THE LATE 1970'S, AND OTHER FACTORS. SINCE THESE FACTORS WILL DIFFER FOR VARIOUS NATIONS, THE RATIO OF HAW TO MAW MIGHT WELL BE DIFFERENT (GENERALLY LOWER NUMBER OF HAWS IN NORTHAG, FOR EXAMPLE). FURTHER DETAILED NATIONAL STUDIES OF THE EVENTUAL NUMBER AND MIX OF HAW AND MAW REQUIRED FOR EACH ARMY WOULD BE REQUIRED

IN THIS SECOND PHASE.

7. IN EACH PHASE, THE ANTITANK CAPABILITIES OF NATIONAL COMMAND FORCES AND LIGHT UNITS WOULD BE GREATLY INCREASED, THUS INCREASING THEIR CREDIBLE CONTRIBUTION TO NATO DEFENSE.

8. NATO SHOULD ALSO CONTINUE ITS HELO, BARRIER AND TANK PROGRAMS AS SCHEDULED AND ADD SUITABLE AMOUNTS OF AIR ANTI-ARMOR WEAPONS AS MAY BE DETERMINED IN WAR RESERVE STOCKS PLANNING (SEE STATE 204111). THESE PROGRAMS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DETRACT FROM EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF BASIC INFANTRY ANTITANK PROGRAM.

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9. WE RECOGNIZE THAT MUCH OF THIS MAY ALREADY BE PROGRAMMED BY ALLIES, BUT WE ARE UNABLE TO DETERMINE EXACTLY HOW MUCH. PARTLY FOR THIS REASON, WE WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE COST ESTIMATES. WE ASSUME HEAVY WEAPONS CAN BE MOUNTED ON EXISTING OR PROGRAMMED VEHICLES, AS US HAS DONE WITH TOW AND M-113. US IS WILLING TO SHARE FURTHER THE PLANNING RATIONALES THAT LED TO PARTICULAR PROGRAMS, AND TO PARTICULAR MIXES OF LAUNCHERS AND MISSILES. THE US IS PREPARED TO BRIEF THE EWG ON ITS STUDY EFFORTS AND TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IF IT IS DESIRED.

10. ADEQUATE AND ACCURATE REPORTING WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE THAT VISIBLE IMPROVEMENTS ARE BEING MADE IN NATO'S ANTITANK PROGRAM AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE DETERRENT. FOR THIS REASON, WE AGAIN URGE GENERAL CIRCULATION OF EXISTING SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION TABLES, WITH ADEQUATE DATA ON PROGRAMMED ANTITANK WEAPONS LAUNCHERS.

11. OUR ANALYSIS IS INCOMPLETE AS TO WHETHER THESE ALTERNATIVES WOULD BY THEMSELVES PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT COMBAT CAPABILITY FOR NATO. THESE ANALYSES WILL PROCEED, AND WE WILL SHARE THEM WITH NATO AS AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, THERE IS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE THAT THESE PROGRAMS WOULD REPRESENT A VERY BIG IMPROVEMENT IN CAPABILITY. WE ARE ALSO AWARE OF THE

NEED TO KEEP BALANCE IN THE FORCES FOR THE OTHER MISSIONS THEY MUST PERFORM IN ADDITION TO THAT OF ANTI-ARMOR.

12. WE WOULD LIKE MINISTERS TO AGREE IN DECEMBER TO THE FOLLOWING:

A. AS A FIRST PRIORITY, INTENSIFY, DEFINE PRECISELY,

OR OTHERWISE MAKE EARLY PROGRESS IN INFANTRY ANTITANK WEAPON PROGRAMS, IN THE FIRST PHASE BY REPLACING OLDER WEAPONS ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS, AND IN THE SECOND PHASE BY INCREASING DENSITIES OF WEAPONS IN MANEUVER AND RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS.

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B. APPROVE A TIME-PHASED PLAN FOR THE ABOVE, WITH THE FIRST PHASE TO BE FULLY PROGRAMMED BY END-1974. ANTITANK WEAPON PROGRAMS SHOULD BE ADJUSTED ACCORDING TO THE RESULTS OF THE SECOND PHASE STUDIES. IN ANY EVENT, BOTH PHASES SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED BY END-1977.

C. CONTINUE PRESENT TANK, BARRIER AND ATTACK HELICOPTER PROGRAMS.

D. PROVIDE A SUITABLE MIX OF AIR ANTI-ARMOR WEAPONS, AS MAY BE DETERMINED IN THE PLANNING FOR WAR RESERVE STOCKS.

E. REPORT STATUS AND PROGRESS OF THESE PROGRAMS IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE.

A SIMPLE NATO ANTITANK WEAPONS PLAN: PHASE 1
(CENTER REGION ONLY)

1. RETAIN EXISTING MODERN WEAPONS

TOW COBRA (US - BY 1975)	165
TOW (US)	77
TOW/M-113 (US)	432
SWINGFIRE FERRET (UK)	357
SWINGFIRE FV 438 (UK)	134
JPZ KANONE	704
M551 SHERIDAN	558
AMX 13/SS11	184
TOTAL	2611

2. REPLACE EXISTING HEAVY WEAPONS

SS-11 HELO (TOW OR SWINGFIRE HELO)	194
VIGILANT FV 714 (MILAN)	54
VIGILANT (MILAN)	222
JPZ RAKETE (HOT)	316

SS-11 3/4 TON (HOT)	294
ENTAC/AMX-13 (HOT)	252
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ENTAC 1/4 TON (HOT)	388
ENTAC (HOT OR MILAN)	360
COBRA (MILAN)	720
COBRA 1/4 TON (MILAN)	178
120 RR (SWINGFIRE)	1314
106 RR (TOW OR HOT)	1099
90 RR (DRAGON - US, BY 1976)	2016
TOTAL	5907

3. REPLACE ALL CARL GUSTAV'S WITH DRAGON 6629

4. GRAND TOTAL 15147

5. AIR MUNITIONS (E.G. MAVERICK)

NOTE: MANY OF THESE REPLACEMENTS ARE ALREADY PROGRAMMED
BY COUNTRIES, BUT WHETHER ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS
IS NOT KNOWN.

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